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The CaML Model of  
Pantheism 
NIKK EFFINGHAM 
Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom, B30 1AD 
e-mail: nikk.effingham@gmail.com  
ABSTRACT: This paper argues for a new understanding of pantheism whereby God is a multi-located 
mereological simple which constitutes the cosmos. I argue that the traditional theist can more readily 
accept this version of pantheism than a version identifying God with the cosmos.1  
‘Pantheism’ is defined in many different ways (Pfeifer [2016: 41-43] discusses a representative 
sample). For the purpose of this paper, pantheism (broadly construed) will be the claim that God 
is the cosmos. We can interpret that broad claim in different ways depending upon what we mean 
by ‘God’, ‘is’, and ‘the cosmos’.  
In this paper ‘the cosmos’ refers to the maximal fusion of everything physical (thus other 
universes, if there be any, are parts of the cosmos).2 The conceit of this paper is that we can readily 
combine classical theism with pantheism, thus ‘God’ will be taken to be a personal agent who has 
the standard batch of omniqualities (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence etc.).  
The meat of this paper is how we understand ‘is’. The standard treatment takes ‘is’ to be the ‘is 
of numerical identity’, getting us:  
IDENTITY PANTHEISM: God is numerically identical to the cosmos. [cf Hewitt 2019] 
But problems arise given IDENTITY PANTHEISM. Given that He’s identical to a fifteen billion light 
year wide hypersphere teeming with matter, how can God be mereologically simple? Or 
immutable? Or a person? One option is to be revisionary, discarding those elements of classical 
theism which clash with IDENTITY PANTHEISM—God would end up being a mereologically 
complex, mutable, impersonal agent (etc.). But this paper’s conceit is to keep a more-or-less 
classical understanding of ‘God’ so I’ll instead adopt an alternative understanding of ‘is’, treating it 
as the ‘is of constitution’. Recasting pantheism in this way avoids IDENTITY PANTHEISM and allows 
pantheists to capture a more classical theism than would otherwise have been thought. Believing 
that God constitutes the cosmos is one component of the pantheistic model I advance in this paper 
(the ‘C-component’).  
The second component is included to likewise help reconcile pantheism with as much of classical 
theism as possible. It is the ‘aML-component’: God is multi-located at every point within the 
                                                        
1 Acknowledgements: Thanks to the stipend provided by the Pantheism and Panenethiesm Project, funded by the John 
Templeton Foundation. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful advice 
and comments.  
2 This would define theories like Nagasawa’s ‘modal panentheism’ [2016] as a variety of pantheism proper (as 
already noted by Nagasawa [2016: 93-4]).  
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cosmos. A full explanation of what this amounts to must wait until §2. Together, though, these 
components comprise the ‘CaML Model of Pantheism’ which better gels pantheism together with 
classical theism. 
This is how this paper proceeds. After a preamble about the nature of location (§1) I introduce 
the two components of the model (§§2-3) before explaining how they resolve some problems with 
combining pantheism with the tenets of classical theism: God’s independence (and, to a lesser 
extent, God’s simplicity) (§4); God’s immutability (§5); God’s being a person (§6); and how God 
can be the cosmos when the cosmos is flawed (§7). I end with a brief discussion of why a traditional 
theist may be attracted to such a version of pantheism (§8). 
1. Multi-Location 
1.1 Chorology 
Start with understanding some basics in the philosophy of location (‘chorology’).3 Use ostension 
to define the three-place relation ‘__ is exactly located at __ (at time __)’ (equivalently: ‘__ exactly 
occupies __ (at time ___)’): cubes are exactly located at just one cube-shaped region at any given 
time; the Kuiper Belt exactly occupies a scattered region composed of lots of non-overlapping 
asteroid shaped regions; at all times, a sphere of radius r is exactly located at some region with a 
volume equal to 4 3⁄  πr
3.  
That relation is temporally relativized. There’s an analogous relation which is atemporal: ‘__ is 
(atemporally) exactly located at __’. That relation holds between an object and a spatiotemporal 
region. For instance, I am atemporally exactly located at an extended region of spacetime stretching 
from 1979 to, hopefully, far in the future. This temporally relativized/atemporal division is 
ubiquitous. Consider geometrical relations. A circular flatlander who persists through time will be 
a circle at a time but would atemporally be a cone. Consider mereological relations. If my car has a 
flat tyre then when we put a new wheel on it, the wheel is a part of the car at that point in time but 
(because their spacetime worms merely overlap) the tyre is not an atemporal part of the car. Consider 
emotions. I am happy at a certain point in time, but it makes little sense to say I’m atemporally 
happy, although it (arguably) makes sense to say that my instantaneous temporal part at that certain 
time is atemporally happy. So there being two analogous location relations is not idiosyncratic to 
chorology.  
Next, introduce ‘multi-location’:  
x is multi-located at the Ŗs (at t) (in the temporally relativized sense) =df there are at least 
two spatial regions, the Ŗs, and x is exactly located (at t) at each Ŗ.  
x is atemporally multi-located at the Rs (at t) =df there are at least two spatiotemporal 
regions, the Rs, and x is exactly located at each R. 
If you believe in the possibility of time travel, you believe in the possibility of temporally relativized 
multi-location. Imagine Marty, a 6’ tall time traveller from the future, returns back in time and 
stands next to his shorter, 4’ tall, self. Marty is in two places at once [Effingham 2015b, 2020; 
MacBride 1998: 222] and is exactly located, in the temporally relativized sense, at two spatial regions 
                                                        
3 For more on location, see Parsons [2007].  
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at the same time.4 Since time travel is possible, it follows that temporally relativized multi-location 
is possible. 
However, the CaML model will require things to be atemporally multi-located. I am ambivalent 
about that possibility. Time travel may demonstrate the possibility of temporally relativized multi-
location, but no example similarly demonstrates the possibility of atemporal multi-location. The 
closest we get would be those endurantists who believe that persisting entities are atemporally 
multi-located at different regions of spacetime [Effingham 2012]—that form of endurantism would 
be an example of atemporal multi-location. But a particular understanding of endurantism, which 
is just a speculative thesis in analytic metaphysics, is a step more dubitable than the time travel 
example that the everyday person can get their head around. So that’s a reason to doubt that 
atemporal multi-location is possible. But before we give up on its possibility too quickly, consider 
a conflicting motivation. We might think atemporal exact location is a fundamental relation. Given 
a standard understanding of recombination, that fundamental relation would be recombinable, thus 
allowing for atemporal multi-location. So I am in two minds about the possibility of atemporal 
multi-location. I think there’s enough to be said in its defence to mean that it’s worthwhile assuming 
it to be possible—even if solely for the purpose of philosophical exploration—in order to see what 
work it could do. Thus, this paper sets asides worries about the impossibility of atemporal multi-
location and assumes that it’s possible.   
1.2 Gainsaying 
Consider the geometric properties of objects (e.g. size and shape). They supervene on the 
geometric properties of the region which such an object exactly occupies (e.g. a cube must be 
exactly located at a cube-shaped region, a sphere at a sphere shaped region etc.) [Calosi 2014: 124; 
Gilmore 2018; McDaniel 2003: 310; 2007: 135; Skow 2007]. A time travelling object multi-located 
in the temporally relativized sense thus inherits multiple sets of geometric properties; time travellers 
that visit themselves will have two (or more) sizes and shapes. For instance, Marty is both 4’ tall 
and 6’ tall. The same thinking applies to other properties; for instance, a painted cube which travels 
back in time may be both black all over and red all over. Such claims appear contradictory, but 
they’re not because they’re not of the form . Given certain conditionals (e.g. ‘If an object is 
4’ tall at time t then it is not 6’ tall at time t’) they would entail a contradiction, but it seems natural—
given the examples of time travellers just cited—to think that such conditionals are false of multi-
located things. So the claims aren’t contradictions. Call them ‘gainsayers’ instead. Gainsayers are 
prima facie contradictory but secunda facie consistent. (I defend this understanding of gainsayers more 
extensively elsewhere [Effingham 2020].) 
                                                        
4 One might object that Marty instead merely exactly occupies the union of the two regions. I deal with this objection 
elsewhere [Effingham 2020], so neglect discussion of it here.   
Page | 4 
 
If gainsayers can be true in the case of temporally relativized multi-location, gainsayers can 
presumably be true in the case of atemporal multi-location. Imagine two flatlanders. Harry the 
flatlander grows from a point to a circular shape over time; Harry is thus atemporally conical. Laura 
the flatlander grows in a similar fashion, but atemporally multi-locates. The first half of her 
existence atemporally exactly occupies one spacetime region; she is thus atemporally conical. The 
second half of her existence atemporally exactly occupies a distinct region; she is thus atemporally 
a frustum. See figure 1. Being both a cone and a frustum would normally be contradictory, but it 
isn’t in a case where, like Laura, something is multi-located—claims about her shape are mere 
gainsayers, not contradictions.  
2. The Multi-Located God 
Having pinned down the basics of chorology (and multi-location), consider one component of 
the CaML model:  
-AML COMPONENT: God (atemporally) exactly occupies every point of spacetime. 
Two things straightaway follow from -AML COMPONENT. 
First: It entails, and explains, God’s omnipresence. Whilst God is not exactly located at every 
region (for -AML COMPONENT entails only that He’s exactly located at the point-sized parts of every 
region) He’d nonetheless be present at every region were we to follow Pruss [2013: 62] in taking 
‘present at’ to be the relation of weak location: 
x is weakly located at a region R =df (i) there exists a region r at which x is exactly located 
and (ii) R overlaps r. 
And it certainly seems reasonable to say of an object weakly located at a region that it’s ‘present’ 
at that region. For example, I’m weakly located at Birmingham and it seems true enough to say that 
I’m therefore present in Birmingham. Were that what presentness consisted in, -AML COMPONENT 
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would entail that God is present at every region.5 Thus, -AML COMPONENT can recommend itself 
on the grounds that it entails a classical theistic claim, namely that God is present everywhere.6 
Second: -AML COMPONENT allows for God to be in Heaven. If there is a non-physical realm—a 
place for God the Father (and/or the angels, Cartesian souls etc.) to reside—then God is present 
there too, just as long as that non-physical realm is composed of points. That a non-physical realm 
such as Heaven can be composed of points is an idea I’ve discussed more fully elsewhere 
[Effingham 2015a], but I’ll briefly sketch what it involves. Spacetime is made of points; the points 
are spatiotemporal in virtue of standing in certain spatiotemporal relations to one another. My 
claim is that non-physical realms are also made of points—or, as I’ll assume for example purposes, 
a single point. That point doesn’t stand in any spatiotemporal relation to any other points (nor any 
spatial or temporal relations to any other points). Because it doesn’t stand in such relations, the 
point isn’t spatiotemporal (nor spatial, nor temporal) [Effingham and Melia 2007]; it’s ‘outside 
space and time’. Such a point can nonetheless still be a relatum of a chorological relation. Thus 
entities, like God, can still be (atemporally) exactly located at it.  
Were God multi-located in both Heaven and (as -AML COMPONENT requires) at every point which 
is a part of spacetime, then this would reconcile certain tensions between pantheism and classical 
theism.  
First tension to be resolved: Classically, God is outside space and time, but pantheism 
seems to entail that God is spatiotemporal. -AML COMPONENT allows us to say that God 
is both outside space and time and inside it—God is both timeless and temporal! Just as 
Laura the flatlander is both a cone and a frustum, God is atemporal, eternal, and outside 
spatiotemporality (in virtue of exactly occupying the point that is Heaven) whilst also 
getting to be temporal (in virtue of exactly occupying points which are a part of regular 
spacetime). God being both atemporal and temporal is no contradiction, rather it is a non-
contradictory gainsayer. Tension resolved.7  
Indeed, independently of pantheism we might have similar worries. Historically, there 
have been issues reconciling God’s omnipresence (and thus his location within spacetime) 
with his being immaterial (Inman [2017] has an excellent discussion of the various views 
on this matter). -AML COMPONENT affords a new avenue of response: God is—in some 
sense—material in virtue of being present in spacetime, but is also immaterial in virtue of 
exactly occupying Heaven.  
                                                        
5 If we placed stronger demands on what ‘present at’ requires, God could well still be omnipresent. For instance, 
we might think that to be present at a region is to ‘fill’ it: 
x fills R =df R is a (possibly improper) sub-region of the fusion of every region which x exactly occupies. 
Here’s an example to help understand ‘filling’. Return to Marty meeting his younger self. Were they to re-enact E.T. 
and touch fingertips then Marty would fill the region exactly occupied by both hands. Atemporal filling would be 
an analogue of that. Given -AML COMPONENT, God atemporally fills every region, so if ‘presence’ was instead ‘filling’, 
God would again be present at every region. 
6 This leads to a theory of omnipresence very similar to that of Pruss [2013]. It differs in so far as Pruss treats God’s 
multi-location as temporally relativized, rather than atemporal. (My view is also within the same ballpark as 
Hudson’s view [2009], although Hudson thinks God is a gigantic extended simple, rather than a multiply located 
point-sized thing.) 
7 Whilst God ‘is temporal’ that needn’t mean He has all temporal features. For instance, I don’t believe He persists—
see §5. This isn’t a problem. It’s quite standard for God’s temporality to not require that He has every temporal 
feature; see Deng [2019: 38ff] for discussion.  
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Second tension to be resolved: Some worry that, given pantheism, God ends up with the 
wrong modal properties (and wrong persistence conditions etc.). For example: Were the 
cosmos created, then if God is identical to it then God is also created—a serious challenge 
to His aseity [cf Forrest 1997]! Another example: Since God cannot fail to exist, we might 
think pantheism wrongly entails both that spacetime necessarily exists and that God’s 
existence is necessarily connected to spacetime’s [Oakes 2006: 175-6]. -AML COMPONENT, 
coupled with this understanding of Heaven, resolves both issues. This is because, were 
the cosmos to not exist, God would still exist for (in both cases) God would still exist at 
the Heavenly, non-spatial/non-temporal, realm.   
3. The Constitutive God 
The second component of the model is: 
 C- COMPONENT: God constitutes the cosmos (and everything within it).8  
By ‘constitute’ I mean the same relation that constitution theorists say holds between lumps of 
clay and statues. Imagine a lump of clay, L, is moulded into a statue, S. So says the constitution 
theorist, L pre-exists S and thus (given the Indiscernibility of Identicals) S and L are distinct. 
Indeed, they differ regarding other properties: L, but not S, can survive being squashed (thus they 
have differing persistence conditions); S, not L, is essentially statue-shaped (thus their modal 
properties differ); S, not L, is Romanesque (thus their aesthetic properties differ) [Fine 2003]. 
Constitution theorists say that whilst S and L are distinct, S constitutes L (and, similarly, lumps of 
wood constitute tables, lumps of flesh constitute human bodies etc.).   
C- COMPONENT is what makes the CaML model a pantheistic model (and allows for an alternative 
to IDENTITY PANTHEISM, whereby there’s a difference between God and the cosmos, contra Francks 
[1979]). Everyone agrees that there are at least two types of ‘is’: The ‘is’ of identity (as in ‘Superman 
is Clark Kent’) and the ‘is’ of predication (as in ‘The ball is red’). Constitution theorists add a third: 
The ‘is’ of constitution, whereby one entity ‘is’ another in the sense that it constitutes the other. In 
sentences like ‘Michelangelo’s David is a lump of clay’ the ‘is’ is functioning as the ‘is’ of 
constitution. Given C- COMPONENT, when we say that ‘God is the cosmos’—the traditional 
pantheistic claim!—we would be correct because God constitutes the cosmos. God is distinct from 
the universe, even though it’s true that God is the universe.9  
                                                        
8 Given both components—and because spatiotemporal regions are parts of the cosmos—God exactly occupies 
that which He constitutes. This would be problematic if we believed both: 
 CONSTITUENT PRIORITY: If x constitutes y then x is more fundamental than y. 
 REGION PRIORITY: If x exactly occupies r then r cannot ontologically depend upon x. 
God would then be both more and less fundamental than the regions He occupies, which is contradictory. The 
solution is to deny REGION PRIORITY. And that’s a defensible denial. If it’s a fact that a exactly occupies b, that can 
either be a fundamental fact or a derivative fact [cf Inman 2017]. For instance, an immanent universal exactly 
occupying a region is a derivative fact, holding in virtue of the (possibly fundamental) fact that an instance of the 
universal exactly occupies that region. Another example: Given supersubstantivalism, objects exactly occupy their 
locations in virtue of being identical to them; again, their being located somewhere is a derivative fact. Similar to 
supersubstantivalism, it’s natural to think that if some x constitutes a region, x exactly occupies that region—in 
which case, REGION PRIORITY would be false. And this is what I say God does: He constitutes the regions He exactly 
occupies. 
9 One referee pointed out that if we eschewed the ‘is’ of constitution (see, e.g., Pickel [2010]) then the CaML model 
would nevertheless seem to be a pantheistic theory even given that ‘God is the cosmos’ is false. For those who 
believe in constitution, but also eschew the ‘is’ of constitution, this is an open position.  
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I am not the first to suggest that something like C- COMPONENT might be true. Framing it in a 
hylomorphic context, 12th century philosopher David of Dinant argued that God is the underlying 
matter of all things [Moran 1989: 86]. There are also contemporary claims which are very similar: 
Oakes [2006] argues that God’s omnipresence constitutes the cosmos (although he doesn’t believe 
that this commits one to pantheism, presumably because he has in mind IDENTITY PANTHEISM); 
Oakes also reads Garrigou-Lagrange’s Thomist exegesis as saying that ‘[a pantheistic God] is the 
‘ground’ or ‘foundation’ of the universe’ [Oakes 1977: 170]; Forrest [2016a: 71-72] believes C- 
COMPONENT entails panentheism (albeit not pantheism); Pfeifer [2016] argues that God stands to 
the universe as a mass substrate (e.g. a mass of gold) stands to an object (e.g. a golden wedding 
ring); Johnston [2009: 97] says that the universe constitutes God (which is similar in so far as its 
converse is C-COMPONENT); Nolan [2018: 94-95] introduces a (presumably multi-located!) God that 
is a proper part of every spacetime point (adding, unlike me, that this God composes Herself). So 
C- COMPONENT is a claim already similar to claims already extant. 
The bulk of this paper (§§4-6) explains how both components solve various problems with 
reconciling pantheism with classical theism. Before moving to that discussion, first consider two 
objections to C- COMPONENT.  
First Objection: Multi-located entities can’t constitute further entities.  
This objection needs its motivation fleshing out. I’m not sure what things will qualify as being 
mereological simples—perhaps superstrings, or quarks, or some such. Label whatever they are 
‘Leucippions’. For sake of argument, I’ll assume that Leucippions are point-sized. Usually, 
composite objects are composed of distinct Leucippions. But we could imagine that a time 
travelling Leucippion, looped back in time many, many times, could compose a composite object. 
I’ve previously argued that in such cases, such composites would be distinct from the multi-located 
Leucippion [Effingham and Robson 2007; Effingham 2010; see also Gilmore 2007]. So a time 
travelling Leucippion could, by itself, compose both a lump of clay and the statue constituted by 
that lump. But we may resist saying that the Leucippion also constitutes the statue. ‘Constitution’ and 
‘composition’ are different relations. Composition is the following (well-understood) mereological 
relation: 
The ys compose x =df (i) every y is a part of x; (ii) no part of x fails to overlap a y; (iii) no 
two ys overlap. [van Inwagen 1990: 29] 
‘Constitution’ is a different relation—one which far less well understood [Wasserman 2004] (and 
which I have no analysis of to offer in this paper). Once we assume that the multi-located 
Leucippion composes the statue, it becomes awkward to say that it likewise constitutes it—the 
thing which constitutes the statue is the lump, which is composed of—not identical to—the 
Leucippion. In general, if x (or the xs) compose y, and y constitutes z, we tend not to think that 
x(/the xs) constitute z. So we shouldn’t think that the Leucippion constitutes the statue any more 
than we should think that a plurality of Leucippions constitute a statue in regular (non-time 
travelling) cases where such pluralities compose both a lump and the statue which it constitutes. 
And what we say of the Leucippion would be said of God: A multi-located God may compose the 
cosmos, but why—goes this objection—would we suggest that God constitutes the cosmos? 
It boils down to what we should say about the regular, non-time travelling case in which lots of 
Leucippions compose a statue and a distinct lump of clay. I believe we should say that the plurality 
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does constitute the statue! The only reason to deny this would be a staunch commitment to 
constitution being a one-one relation relating only singular entities, which would exclude pluralities 
from being a relatum. If pluralities couldn’t constitute anything then, in the regular non-time 
travelling case, a plurality of Leucippions can’t constitute anything; by extension, the single time-
travelling, multi-located Leucippion (which is otherwise playing the same role as that plurality) can’t 
constitute anything either. Such constitution theorists would believe:  
SINGULAR CONSTITUTION: The two relata of the constitution relation are always (i) singular 
entities, not pluralities, where (ii) those entities exactly occupy the same region. 
If we extend this thinking to a multi-located God, then whilst He might compose the cosmos 
SINGULAR CONSTITUTION rules out God constituting the cosmos (for, whilst He’s a singular entity, 
He’s playing the same ‘role’ as a plurality of spacetime points; since the latter can’t constitute the 
cosmos, nor can God).  
Given I believe that the plurality of Leucippions can constitute the statue, I deny SINGULAR 
CONSTITUTION. And it’s an eminently plausible denial. Put aside worries about time travel and 
multi-location and consider just two normal tables: an old, aged, oak table (‘Oaky’) and a modern 
Noguchi table consisting of curved, ash wooden legs, with a heavy plate glass top (‘Noguchi’). A 
lump of oak constitutes Oaky. Noguchi is partially constituted by a lump of ash and partially 
constituted by a lump of glass. Thus, a plurality of entities constitute Noguchi and SINGULAR 
CONSTITUTION is false. Similarly, we should say that lots of Leucippions could constitute a statue; 
similarly, there’s no reason to deny that a single, time-travelling, Leucippion could do likewise; 
similarly, there’s no reason to deny that a multi-located God can constitute the cosmos. 
But this is too quick. The response will be that Noguchi isn’t constituted by two things. Instead, 
Noguchi is constituted solely by the singular, heterogeneous fusion of the lump of ash and the 
lump of glass. But what if there was no heterogeneous fusion? What if mereological universalism 
were false and the lumps had no such fusion? In that case, Noguchi would have to be (collectively) 
constituted by the plurality of the two lumps.  
The constitution theorist should not respond by saying that there must be a fusion of the lumps, 
for building a commitment to mereological universalism (or any reasonably liberal principle of 
composition) into constitution theory seems too strong a move. A better suggestion is to say that 
nothing constitutes Noguchi in such a case. The idea would be that only when two entities are 
superposed does constitution come into play: Oaky, in being superposed with the singular lump of 
oak, must be a constituted thing; Noguchi, in being superposed neither with the lump of glass nor 
with the lump of ash, need not be constituted by anything. But there are good reasons to deny 
precisely this move.  
First reason: I suspect that some constitution theorists might think along these lines, and endorse 
SINGULAR CONSTITUTION, because they think that the constitution relation just is the relation which 
holds between two distinct, singular entities when they’re superposed. But constitution theorists 
also want to explain the differing properties of the statue and lump by saying that the lump 
constitutes the statue. Since the constitution relation has explanatory power, and the relation of 
two distinct, singular, entities being superposed has no explanatory power [cf Baker 2000: 46; 
Wasserman 2004], those relations cannot be the same. So this would be a bad reason to believe 
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SINGULAR CONSTITUTION. Indeed, I can’t think of any other positive reason to believe it in the first 
place, so take myself to have undermined the positive case for SINGULAR CONSTITUTION.  
Second reason: Not only do I think there’s no positive case to be made, I think there is reason to 
believe that SINGULAR CONSTITUTION is false. There are common, everyday cases where lots of 
things are collectively superposed with a singular thing e.g. a chair composed of lots of (non-time 
travelling) Leucippions being superposed with those Leucippions. But the chair and the plurality 
of Leucippions have different properties—for instance, the chair is one and the plurality is many, 
and the chair is a composite and the plurality is not etc. But how can they have different properties? 
Isn’t this just the same problem as that of the statue and the lump, but with the slight tweak that 
we’re worried about the collective properties of a plurality rather than properties of a singular whole 
[cf Lowe 1995: 177]? It seems natural for a constitution theorist to explain how the chair and the 
plurality have different properties, even though they’re superposed, in the same way in which they 
explain similar issues in statue/lump cases: The plurality constitutes the chair, thus ameliorating 
worries about them being superposed and having different properties. And if we take that natural 
route, SINGULAR CONSTITUTION must be false. And if it’s false, then we no longer have an objection 
to God constituting the cosmos. 
Second Objection: Constitution cases are always ‘two tier’.  
A lump of clay constitutes a statue. But perhaps there can be no more constitution; at most, there 
are two ‘tiers’ of objects and the statue can’t constitute anything further. C- COMPONENT, however, 
demands three (or more) tier constitution: God constitutes lumps of matter and those lumps of 
matter constitute other things within the cosmos (e.g. statues, tables, people etc.).  
In response, the constitution theorist should say (as some already do [Wasserman 2004: 694-5]) 
that constitution can be more than two tier. Examples are not hard to come by. Imagine an ice 
artist carves a (transient, short-lived) diorama of people. The diorama is constituted by a lump of 
ice (or lots of such lumps). But a similar diorama could be made of living people who stand stock 
still to create a (transient, short-lived) piece of art. In that case, organic matter would constitute 
people, who in turn constitute a piece of art. Or imagine an actor, himself constituted by a lump 
of flesh, who constitutes Hamlet. Or consider Donald Trump, who (at the time of writing) 
constitutes the President of the United States. In short, 3+ tier constitution is acceptable. 
4. The Simple Objection 
C- COMPONENT and -AML COMPONENT comprise the CaML model. §§4-6 explain how the CaML 
model resolves tensions between pantheism and traditional beliefs about theism. This section 
considers a mereological worry.  
Start by sketching the worry. It’s standard to believe that God depends upon nothing. But if God 
had parts then He would depend upon those parts. Because the cosmos has parts, were pantheism 
true we would get a contradiction [Oakes 2006: 177; Steinhart 2004: 64-65; see also Gordon 2018: 
535]. In more detail:  
 FUNDAMENTAL: God is a fundamental being. 
NO PARTS: Anything with proper parts isn’t fundamental. 
COMPOSITE COSMOS: The cosmos is a composite i.e. has proper parts.  
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Given IDENTITY PANTHEISM, we get a contradiction. A similar issue crops up concerning the 
traditional position on divine simplicity [Vallicella 2019]. Given the doctrine of divine simplicity, 
God must be a mereological simple; given that claim—plus COMPOSITE COSMOS and IDENTITY 
PANTHEISM—we get a contradiction. 
Pantheists could abandon traditional theism by denying FUNDAMENTAL (for instance, Oakes 
[2006: 177] argues that we should merely think that God is indestructible, rather than fundamental). 
Alternatively, they could deny COMPOSITE COSMOS (endorsing, say, Schaffer’s [2007] ‘existence 
monism’ whereby only one thing exists) or NO PARTS (by, say, endorsing Schaffer’s [2010] priority 
monism). But a less revisionary route is the CaML model’s denial of IDENTITY PANTHEISM. Given 
C- COMPONENT, God constitutes the cosmos like a lump constitutes a statue. Just as the lump 
needn’t thereby have the statue as a part, God need not have parts either. (This means the pantheist 
must endorse a version of constitution theory denying that constitution involves mutual parthood 
[Cotnoir 2010; Hawthorne 2006; Hovda 2013; Thomson 1998]; I am not a fan of such theories 
and so don’t have a problem with this—see also Walters [2019].) 
Not all of the work is being done by C- COMPONENT; some is also being done by -AML 
COMPONENT. Were God singularly located across the cosmos, rather than multi-located at every 
point of it, then God would be stretched out across spacetime. That’s problematic for two reasons. 
Firstly, God could only be such a simple were we to believe that extended simples were possible. 
I’m comfortable with that possibility, but since others are less comfortable [see Gilmore 2018: §5.4-
5.5] it’d be ideal to avoid God being extended. -AML COMPONENT allows exactly that to be the case 
for God ends up being an unextended point (indeed, in being multiply located, He ends up being 
point-sized many, many times over).  
Secondly, even were you comfortable with extended simples, we would require extended 
mereological simples to constitute mereologically complex objects [Hudson 2006b; Johansson 
2009; Wasserman 2004]. Imagine a statue-shaped extended simple which (i) exactly occupies region 
rs, and (ii) constitutes a statue. Were the statue mereologically complex, it’d have (e.g.) a head, which 
exactly occupies the head-shaped sub-region of rs—call it ‘rh’. But what would constitute the head? 
It can’t be the simple; in exactly occupying rs rather than rh, it’s too big! Presumably, nothing 
constitutes the head. But then the head would exactly occupy a region filled by the simple. 
According to the constitution theorist, this happens only when one thing is a proper part of the 
other (which the head isn’t) or one thing constitutes the other (which the head can’t). Thus, if 
extended simples constituted objects, they must constitute mereologically simple objects. 
Therefore, were God a singularly located extended simple, the cosmos must be mereologically 
simple and have no parts. But that’s just a denial of COMPOSITE COSMOS, which the CaML model is 
meant to help avoid. Better, then, to think that God is multiply located and acknowledge that C- 
COMPONENT alone cannot do all the work in guaranteeing God’s mereological simplicity.  
(Note that if the aim is to guarantee the doctrine of divine simplicity, what I’ve said here only 
goes someway to that meet that aim. It’s a step in the right direction, but cannot be the whole story 
because the doctrine of divine simplicity further requires God to lack other, non-mereological, 
types of constituents.) 
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5. Immutability 
A crude argument against pantheism runs as follows:  
 MUTABLE COSMOS: The cosmos changes and is mutable. 
 IMMUTABLE GOD: God cannot change and is immutable. 
Given IDENTITY PANTHEISM, we get a contradiction [Oakes 1977]. Given I deny IDENTITY 
PANTHEISM, I can avoid that problem. But we can go on to advance a similar, more sophisticated, 
concern which is problematic even for the CaML model. One thing can constitute another only 
when the intrinsic properties of the constititum are a certain way. For instance, a squished lump of 
clay cannot constitute a statue because it’s got the wrong intrinsic properties; when the clay is 
properly moulded, its intrinsic properties are different and it can then constitute a statue. Similarly, 
if God constitutes every Leucippion then, unless all Leucippions are qualitatively identical (a hard 
claim to make stick for perhaps some are charged and some are not, or some spin one way whilst 
others spin another) then God must have certain intrinsic properties at one time and place and 
different intrinsic properties at another. Since His intrinsic properties vary over time, God changes 
and we get the problematic conclusion that a pantheistic, constitutive God is a mutable God.  
-AML COMPONENT does the work in avoiding this problem, allowing some thing to be F at one 
time and G at another without changing. I believe that the motivation for thinking that God must 
change comes from:  
STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE: Things persist from one time to another solely in 
virtue of existing at both of those times [Lewis 1986: 202]. Moreover (where F and G are 
incompatible predicates) something changes from being F at an earlier time to being G at 
a later time iff it’s F at the earlier time and G at the later time. 
But STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE is false. Consider four scenarios. 
Scenario one: At t25, Emmett is born. He is 4’ tall at t50, at which point he clambers into a 
(H.G. Wells style) time machine. Emmett then travels back through the previous instants 
to t1. It takes a while to arrive; when Emmett gets there he’s grown and is 6’ tall.  
Given STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE Emmett has persisted from t1 to t50, which seems 
wrong—it seems more correct to say that he’s persisted from t50 to t1! Further, it entails that 
Emmett changes from being 6’ tall to being 4’ tall. But surely it’s the other way around? 
Scenario two: Marty is born at t1. At t10, Marty is 4’ tall and uses a time machine which 
discontinuously teleports him to t21 (i.e. he does not ‘travel through’ t11-t20). He stays there 
for some time, growing taller and becoming 6’ tall. At t50 he time travels to t11, staying 
there until t20, at which point he returns to the future by time travelling to t51.  
STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE wrongly entails both that Marty persists from t20 to t21 and 
that he changes from being 6’ tall to being 4’ tall.  
Scenario three: Imagine a world at which there is (intuitively) no change. There are just two 
particles: both come into existence at t1 and exist forevermore; one is always negatively 
charged; the other is always positively charged.  
Given an appropriately liberal principle of composition, there’ll be a third object that is composed 
of the temporal parts of the negatively charged particle from t1-t50 plus the temporal parts of the 
positively charged particle from t51 onwards. Given STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE that 
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object changes from being negatively charged to being positively charged, which is ex hypothesi false 
because the world was meant to be changeless. I submit that the world of scenario three is 
intuitively changeless, no matter what composition principle holds, and that it is STANDARD CHANGE 
AND PERSISTENCE which is at fault. 
Scenario four: An interval, T, has a duration of DT units of time. It is composed of instants 
and is ‘closed’ i.e. has a first instant (t1) and last instant (tlast). There are infinitely many 
persisting things (x1, x2…xlast) each of which is qualitatively identical in every way except 
whether or not they time travel: x1 persists through interval T, changing many times during 
its existence (e.g. from being F to being G); x2 persists through the first half of T before 
time travelling back to t1 and persisting ½DT longer; x3 persists through the first quarter 
of T before time travelling back to t1 and persisting ¼ DT longer and, again, time travelling 
back to t1, before doing that twice more; and so on. At the end of this infinite series there’ll 
be an x, xlast, which time travels back to the instant it was just at, never existing at any 
other external time.  
Given STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE xlast doesn’t change and doesn’t persist. But given 
that the other xs change over the course of their existence, and xlast, is intrinsically identical to 
them, it seems odd to say that xlast does not. Similarly, if it’s not persisting then it must at least be 
doing something a lot like persisting! 
So we should deny STANDARD CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE. There is more to persistence than mere 
existence and more to change than mere difference. Introduce ‘immanent causation’ (to be 
distinguished from the ‘transeunt’ causation we normally think about) [Zimmerman 1997: 433ff]. 
Immanent causation connects the different temporal parts of an object; the fact that one’s earlier 
temporal part is a certain way is a fact which immanently affects facts about how one’s later 
temporal parts are—immanent causal relations explain why an object inherits the properties of its 
earlier self. For instance, if I am toothless now, that’s because earlier someone knocked out one of 
my teeth. That causal explanation would be a transeunt causal explanation. There is also an 
immanent causal explanation for me being toothless: My earlier, toothless, stage immanently causes 
my current stage to be toothless as well.  
I propose that we say (i) that to change, one must persist and (ii) that for an x to persist from one 
point to another requires the two stages of x to be connected by immanent causation. This would 
resolve all of the problematic scenarios. In scenario one, no fact about the 6’ stage of Emmett 
immanently causes his 4’ stage to be the way that it is; Emmett, then, does not persist from the 
earlier time to the later. Similarly, his 4’ stage does immanently cause his 6’ stage to be the way that 
it is, thus he ‘persists backwards’. (Note that his 6’ stage might instead non-immanently cause his 4’ 
stage to be the way that it is. For instance, at t4 Emmett may contrive for his earlier self to get a 
tattoo at t28—in that case, his 6’ stage would causally interact with his 4’ stage. But this is ‘transeunt’ 
causation, not the intimate, immanent causation required for persistence.) 
The same things can be said of the other scenarios. In scenario two, the pattern of immanent 
causal interconnections between Marty’s stages won’t bear out his changing from being 6’ tall to 
4’. In scenario three the gerrymandered object’s earlier, negatively charged, temporal parts don’t 
immanently cause its later, positively charged, temporal parts to be charged. Thus it doesn’t change 
over time. In scenario four, there are immanent causal connections between xlast’s stages, just as 
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there are between the stages of the other xs. Thus xlast can change and does persist, albeit persisting 
across many regions of space at the same time.  
The same goes for God. He is F in one place and G in another, but that needn’t imply that He 
changes. He doesn’t change because He doesn’t persist, at least if we believe that there are no 
immanent causal connections between the various multi-located versions of God spread across 
spacetime. And we should build just such a denial into the CaML model, accepting: 
IMMANENTLY ACAUSAL: God immanently causes nothing and is immanently caused by 
nothing.  
Accepting IMMANENTLY ACAUSAL is very plausible for two reasons. 
First: Assuming—as I have thus far—that perdurantism is true, immanent causation is clearly a 
relation between (facts about) temporal parts of a whole. But God is mereologically simple, has no 
atemporal proper parts, and thus has no temporal parts either. So God can’t have immanent causal 
relations within Himself.  
Two: Distinguish ‘external time’—that is, time as measured by the universe—from ‘personal 
time’—that is, time as might be measured by a time traveller’s watch [Lewis 1976: 146]. Pruss [2013] 
persuasively argues that God should be ‘internally timeless’ and have no personal times. And I’ve 
argued elsewhere [Effingham 2020] that for one thing to be later in personal time than some other 
thing is simply for the latter to immanently cause the former. Thus, if God is internally timeless, 
then we must accept IMMANENTLY ACAUSAL. 
In conclusion, we should think that how God is varies from place to place—it must do, in order 
for God to constitute varying things. But this doesn’t imply that God changes, nor persists, nor is 
mutable. 
6. The Personality Objection 
Given materialism, we know that, in at least some cases, consciousness/personhood supervenes 
on complex systems (e.g. a human brain). We may believe that this bears out the following principle: 
CONSCIOUS COMPLEXITY: Complex systems suitably similar to human brains are 
conscious(/a person); complex systems suitably dissimilar to a human brain are not 
conscious(/a person).  
Given: 
DISSIMILAR: The cosmos, in being a complex system of superclusters, galaxies, immense 
tracts of (basically empty) space and so on, is suitably dissimilar to the human brain. 
It follows from IDENTITY PANTHEISM that God would be a suitably dissimilar complex system 
and, given CONSCIOUS COMPLEXITY, could not be a person. Thus pantheists should accept: 
IMPERSONAL: God is in no sense a person/conscious. 
Not every pantheist thinks a commitment to IMPERSONAL is problematic [Forrest 1997; Harrison 
2004; Levine 1994: 3-5; Mander 2016], either begrudgingly accepting it or more enthusiastically 
seeing it as a bonus feature of pantheism. But given I’m trying to keep God’s personhood, I’m 
putting myself alongside such pantheists as Forrest [2016], Pfeifer [2016], the Stoics [Baltzly 2003], 
and Sinclair [Thomas 2019], who all attempt to allow for a pantheistic personal God (see also 
Hewitt [2019]).  
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So the task is to make pantheism consistent with: 
PERSONAL: God is conscious/a person (in either a literal or attenuated, analogous sense). 
The CaML model has it that God constitutes a mereologically complex system suitably dissimilar 
to the human brain, not that He is identical to it. Indeed, as §3 made clear, God is a mereological 
simple. Drawing upon a key insight from Plantinga [2007] about the nature of consciousness, 
mereological simples—in not being complex systems at all!—can have the appropriate properties 
to ground consciousness/personhood. CONSCIOUS COMPLEXITY is a principle solely about complex 
systems; it’s mute about what to say about mereological simples. And rightly so! CONSCIOUS 
COMPLEXITY is compelling because, clearly, the properties of composites supervene upon the nature 
and arrangement of their parts: a steel bar has a certain arrangement of parts which obliges it to be 
solid and unyielding; tissue paper has a certain arrangement of parts which obliges it to be delicate 
and prone to tear; the arrangement and nature of the Statue of Liberty’s parts necessitate that it’s 
93 metres tall etc. The arrangement of parts a composite has delimits what properties the composite 
itself can have. But the same cannot be true of mereological simples because their properties can 
vary even though the arrangement of, and properties of, their proper parts do not vary (for they 
have no proper parts to so vary!). 
Of course, simples can’t have any old property—a mereological simple cannot, for instance, be 
disposed to tear into two pieces/parts. And one might suspect that a simple cannot be conscious 
and that we could construct a new argument, not mentioning CONSCIOUS COMPLEXITY at all, which 
shows that a mereologically simple God could not be conscious. But, again shadowing a point 
made by Plantinga, this lacks dialectical bite. Whilst an atheist may be justified in believing that 
simples aren’t conscious, that’s by-the-by. This paper is trying to sell pantheism to the already-
committed traditional theist. And traditional theists will already believe that God is a mereological 
simple that can be a person and can be conscious. And if simples can be conscious people under 
traditional theism, the CaML model equally makes room for PERSONAL.  
7. The Problem of Evil 
Pantheists are faced by a specific version of the problem of evil (see, e.g., Nagasawa [2016: 100-
101]). Given standard theism, the evils and imperfections of the world are had by things distinct 
from the perfect God. If I am imperfect, that’s my problem; God is not thereby imperfect as well. 
But if pantheism is true, God is the cosmos; since the cosmos is imperfect, God is imperfect. But 
God is perfect and, thus, pantheism cannot be true. Break that down as follows:  
 IMPERFECT PARTS: Some parts of the cosmos are flawed, evil, or otherwise imperfect. 
 GENETIC PERFECTION: A whole is not perfect if it has imperfect parts. 
 DIVINE PERFECTION: God is perfect.  
Given IDENTITY PANTHEISM we get a contradiction.  
Whatever the merits of denying IMPERFECT PARTS or GENETIC PERFECTION (or failing to toe the 
traditional theistic line, by denying DIVINE PERFECTION), the CaML model allows for an interesting 
escape route. The CaML model obviously denies IDENTITY PANTHEISM, but also has an excellent 
explanation for why God needn’t be imperfect. In general, in constitution cases the properties 
which a constitutee has needn’t be the same as its constitutum—for instance, sortal properties, 
persistence conditions (etc.) differ between the statue and the lump. And, since flaws are properties, 
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we needn’t think that the flaws of the constitutee are flaws of the constitutum or vice versa. For 
instance, many statues are aesthetically flawed in some fashion e.g. a statue might have an 
imperfectly carved nose. But this needn’t imply that the lump which constitutes it is also flawed. 
The lump of clay constituting the statue could be flawless—it could be 100% pure clay, easy to 
mould, not too permeable, not too coarse etc. The lump can be perfect even though the statue is 
imperfect.  
Now it’s easy to see what to say about pantheism’s problem of evil: God can be flawless and 
perfect whilst simultaneously constituting a distinct thing—namely the cosmos—which is flawed 
and imperfect. The flawed property attaches, not to the deity, but to the constituted substance. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that even though traditional theists eschew pantheism, they needn’t.  
However, I’ve said little about why the traditional theist should be attracted by pantheism. That’s 
intentional—the main aim of the paper is an attack on the reasons not to be a pantheist. 
Nevertheless, risking the possibility of mission creep, I’ll end with a few comments about why 
traditional theists might find such a model of pantheism attractive.  
First: There are independent arguments for pantheism. Some won’t appeal because pantheists are 
sometimes explicitly motivated to argue for a deity sans traditional theistic features. But not every 
pantheist argument is along those lines—see, for instance, Baltzly [2003: 20-28]. Traditional theists 
might be swayed by such arguments. 
Second: I already explained, in §2, how -AML COMPONENT means that God is both timeless (in 
virtue of being exactly located in Heaven) and temporal (in virtue of being located within 
spacetime). This affords the pantheist a chance to have their cake and eat it too when it comes to 
the competing motivations for God being timeless versus temporal. For instance, Mullins [2016; 
see also Deng 2019: 47] criticises theologians for treating God as being both timeless and temporal. 
He has in mind, e.g., Ware, who says: 
Amazingly, then, at creation God becomes both omnipresent and omnitemporal while 
remaining, in himself apart from creation, fully nonspatial and timelessly eternal. [Ware 
2008: 89] 
Mullins castigates theologians for asserting such contradictions. But now we can see that they’re 
not necessarily contradictions for they could be mere gainsayers; the theologians can keep their 
prima facie contradictory, secunda facie consistent, beliefs about God’s temporality—He is (given the 
CaML model) both timeless and temporal! Thus, we have a reason for the traditional theist to 
accept the CaML model: In order to charitably allow contemporary theologians to be saying true 
things rather than false things.  
Third: Various metaphysical virtues favour CaML Pantheism. Pantheism is more parsimonious 
than standard theism. Rather than deity and cosmos, there is just deity. Given IDENTITY PANTHEISM 
this argument works smoothly, but it also works given C- COMPONENT, even though God ends up 
being distinct from the cosmos. Imagine two rooms: in one there are two distinct things; in the 
other there are three distinct things. The former’s contents are obviously more parsimonious than 
the latter’s. Now imagine two more rooms: in one there are two distinct things, a lump of clay and 
the statue which it constitutes; in the other there are two distinct things, namely two misshapen 
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lumps of clay, neither of which constitutes anything. Again, the former’s contents are intuitively 
more parsimonious than the latter’s, even though both rooms contain the same ‘number of things’. 
It seems intuitive that, when considering parsimony, we should say that when one entity constitutes 
another, that is (to some degree) less ontologically weighty than merely having two distinct entities. 
So an ontology of a deity and a distinct, unconstituted cosmos will be less parsimonious than that 
of a deity which constitutes the cosmos. Parsimony favours CaML Pantheism. 
There are other metaphysical virtues we might be able to capture. Hudson [2006a; 2009: 204] 
argues in favour of the existence of a ‘null individual’, which is a part of everything. He goes on to 
argue that God is a good candidate for the null individual. If x is a part of y if x constitutes y then 
God would be a part of every concrete thing (because God constitutes every simple, and so would 
be a part of everything). So CaML Pantheism makes room for the null individual (and the 
concurrent theoretical benefits of including the null individual in one’s ontology). (It doesn’t quite 
go all the way to achieving this end because, for instance, the CaML model doesn’t entail that God 
is a part of abstracta, should there be any. To get the full power of Hudson’s theory, we’d either 
have to be nominalists or separately commit to God being a part of all abstracta.) 
Fourth: The CaML model allows us to makes sense of the Christian doctrine of perichoresis, the 
mutual indwelling of the Father and the Son whereby each is in the other (see John 10: 38). Given 
the Trinity, -AML COMPONENT would be best interpreted as being a thesis about the location of the 
Father, rather than every Divine Person. We could say that the Son exactly occupies a single four-
dimensional spatiotemporal region, just as any regular, perduring human would. The Son would be 
‘in’ the Father insofar as He exactly occupies a sub-region of the region that the Father fills. The 
Father is ‘in’ the Son in so far as He exactly occupies (numerous) sub-regions of the region which 
the Son exactly occupies. We would have a chorological understanding of perichoresis (which has 
previously been resisted [Cotnoir 2017: 128], although mainly on the grounds that Divine Persons 
aren’t located, which obviously isn’t an issue given the CaML model). 
Fifth: Ex nihilo nihil fit is the principle that nothing comes from nothing. Historical debates about 
ex nihilo nihil fit have considered whether or not traditional Biblical understandings of God are 
committed to its denial. On one side of the fence there are those who believe the Biblical account 
can only be true were ex nihilo nihil fit false, and that God summoned the universe into existence 
from nothing. On the other side of the fence there are those who believe ex nihilo nihil fit must be 
true, and that nothing can genuinely be brought into being; this presumably undermines the Biblical 
account of creation for it’d then look as if we’re committed to saying that prime matter has eternally 
existed and that God merely shaped, rather than created, the cosmos.  
CaML Pantheism carves an intermediate path. We can accept ex nihilo nihil fit but still accept that 
the cosmos came into existence a finite amount of time ago, with no prime matter pre-existing it. 
Instead, God’s divine fiat was to multi-locate Himself so as to make spacetime; constituting 
spacetime (and its contents) was God’s ‘creative’ act. But it wasn’t creative in a way offending ex 
nihilo nihil fit. Those who believe ex nihilo nihil fit—unless they are the most extreme Parmenidean—
won’t deny that a sculptor can shape a lump of clay and manage to create a statue. On the standard 
ex nihilo nihil fit view, the matter which constitutes the clay has existed eternally; thus whilst the 
statue may come into being, its underlying constitutum—i.e. the eternally existing matter—existed 
all along. The ban is on underlying, fundamental substances coming into existence, not constituted 
things. Thus God can bring the cosmos into existence ‘from nothing’ because the cosmos is a 
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constituted thing. And the underlying constitutum of the cosmos, and of everything within the 
cosmos, is uncontroversially an uncreated thing which exists eternally and necessarily, for it is God. 
God’s creation of the universe is no longer a summoning into existence of matter from nowhere, 
but a divine action to make His chorological properties a certain way. Once God has fixed His 
location, and made Himself into a multi-located thing, He has created no underlying substance but 
has brought a lot of constituted things into existence (namely the cosmos and its contents). Thus 
the CaML Pantheist can endorse a traditional, Biblical line whilst avoiding a denial of ex nihilo nihil 
fit. Depending upon your metaphysical mores and feelings about ex nihilo nihil fit, this may be a 
persuasive benefit. Indeed, this view on pantheism and creation is not wholly original [Mander 
2000]. For instance, it’s a view similar to Eriguena’s emanation pantheism; as Mander says, ‘[t]o 
Eriugena, God is precisely the nothing from which all things were made.’ [Mander 2016]. Similarly, 
May Sinclair believed that pantheism was intimately connected with issues of creation [Thomas 
2019].10  
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